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Purpose 
To determine the factors associated with arbitration awards in unfair dismissal complaints under 
Australian federal legislation and to assess whether employees benefit from arbitration. 
 
Methodology 
This research involves an empirical analysis of 342 decisions in 17 industries by arbitrators in 
the Australian Industrial Relations Commission over the four year period 1997-2000. Logistic 




The findings of this study indicate that 50.6% of arbitration decisions were in favour of 
employees and only 10.8% of complainants were reinstated. Independent variables which are 
significantly associated with each of the three dependent variables are identified. 
 
Research Implications 
The results of this study enable researchers to gain a deeper understanding of the arbitration 
process and recognise independent variables that are associated with the arbitrator’s decision in 




Employers lose half the unfair dismissal cases that go to arbitration. To reduce legal and 
associated costs, employers may need to look at ways of creating a more harmonious workplace. 
Employees do not benefit much from arbitration and have little chance of reclaiming their jobs. 
Reaching a settlement through mediation may be a better option. 
 
Originality/Value 
This is the first study to assess arbitration decisions in Australia. By developing a conceptual 
model based on arbitration outcomes and structuring the analysis on this model, the paper 







In a world of rapid organisational change, the right to continuous employment has become very 
precious. People build much of their lives around their jobs. Their incomes and prospects for the 
future are inevitably founded on the expectation that their jobs will continue. Thus, the 
consequences of dismissal are very tragic. For some employees, it may mean breaking up a 
community, uprooting homes and relocating families. Others, particularly older employees, may 
be faced with the greatest difficulty of finding another job (Report of the Donovan Royal 
Commission on Trade Unions and Employer Associations, 1965-78). Given the significant 
adverse impact of a dismissal, many employees in Australia have sought the help of arbitrators to 
reclaim their jobs. An unfair dismissal occurs when the termination of employment is considered 
to be unfair, harsh or unreasonable (Wallace-Bruce, 1999). The primary remedy for unfair 
dismissals in Australia is reinstatement. The grant of compensation is only a secondary remedy 
(section 170 CH  [3] of the Workplace Relations Act, 1996). 
 
In Australia, three legal avenues cover unfair dismissals. The first legal avenue available is common 
law (Macken, O’Grady & Sappideen, 1997). The courts are generally the avenue for senior 
managers (on an annual salary of over $81,500 in 2002 and indexed annually) whose termination 
from employment is neither covered by a specific statute nor by a collective agreement (Grubb & 
Naughton, 1992). The second legal avenue governing dismissal is Federal law. The Workplace 
Relations Act, 1996 conferred unfair dismissals jurisdiction on the Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission (AIRC). Commonwealth public sector employees, territory employees, employees of a 
constitutional corporation or engaged in interstate or overseas trade and most employees in the State 




provisions of the Workplace Relations Act, 1996 which sends non-federal award employees back to 
their state jurisdictions with the exception of Victoria which transferred most of its industrial power 
to the Commonwealth in 1996 (Wheelwright, 1999). 
 
The scope of this study is limited to the second legal avenue, that is unfair dismissals under the 
Workplace Relations Act, 1996. This paper examines whether employees in Australia have 
actually benefited from the arbitration process. This study seeks to gain an insight into how the 
Commissioners of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission, in their capacity as 
arbitrators, exercised arbitral jurisprudence in the course of interpreting the unfair termination 
provisions of the Workplace Relations Act, 1996. 
 
FEDERAL LEGISLATION ON UNFAIR DISMISSALS 
In Australia, federal unfair dismissal provisions had been in operation from March 1994, when 
Parliament under the Labour Government amended the Industrial Relations Act, 1988 by passing 
the Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 with a new Part VIA relating to termination of 
employment (Blackford, 1999). These amendments contained the most comprehensive 
protections against unfair dismissal ever seen in Australia (Howell, 1998).  
 
In March 1996, the current Liberal Government was elected, replacing the Labour government. 
Within nine months, the Workplace Relations Act, 1996 was approved. This legislation 
introduced major changes to federal law relating to protection of employees against unfair 
dismissal, including further restricting the already limited relief available to employees who have 




to arbitrate on matters of unfair dismissal matters. In arbitration of an unfair dismissal claim, the 
arbitrators can order reinstatement, re-employment to another position, or payment of 
compensation (Macken, O’Grady & Sappideen, 1997).  
 
Many workers have been excluded altogether from the operation of the Workplace Relations 
Act, 1996. These factors are reflected in the drastic reduction in the number of applications for 
relief under federal legislation since the Workplace Relations Act, 1996 came into effect. In the 
period from 31 December, 1996 to 3 October, 1997, 5222 federal unfair dismissal applications 
were made, compared with 11,196 applications in the preceding year (Howell, 1998). This 
represents a 51% decline. It may be argued that this was the primary objective of this legislation. 
It is worth noting that not all complaints proceed to arbitration. A good number are discontinued, 
others are turned down by the Australian Industrial Relations Commission due to lack of merit 
(for example outside the prescribed time limit for application), while others are settled during 
mediation provided by the Australian Industrial Relations Commission. Only a fraction of the 
applications proceed all the way to arbitration. 
 
RESEARCH ON UNFAIR DISMISSALS 
Relatively little research has been conducted in the area of unfair dismissals, even though claims 
against unfair dismissals form a significant portion of employee grievance arbitration. American 
studies have been excluded from this review, as case studies from the U.S.A. do not fit the legal 
or arbitral framework of this study. The doctrine of employment-at-will provides the overarching 
legal basis for the employment relationship in the U.S.A. Employment-at-will assumes that 




intrusion into the activities of free agents is unnecessary and unwelcome (Meggiorin, 1997). 
American workers receive very little protection against unfair dismissal from their jobs. 
Wrongful discharge, as part of the public policy exception to employment-at-will, has been and 
continues to be a very grey area of the law. Generally, studies of the arbitral scene from the 
British Commonwealth countries with close common legal foundations such as the United 
Kingdom, New Zealand and Canada are good comparisons for Australia. However, the few 
studies in these countries have confined themselves to a limited number of variables affecting 
arbitration decisions and generally lack statistical rigour. 
 
Goodman, Earnshaw, Marchington and Harrision (1998) conducted a study funded by the British 
Department of Trade and Industry. This research included factors influencing the incidence, or 
otherwise, of unfair dismissal cases. The research is based on matched comparisons of 
predominantly small businesses or sites in three industries i.e., Hotel and Catering, Transport and 
Communications, and Engineering. The authors reviewed disciplinary procedures in these 
industries and examined some of the major influences such as recruitment practices and 
management styles and methods on the operations of these businesses. The study included data 
of published cases arbitrated by industrial tribunals covering the period 1975 to 1997. In total 36 
cases (12 in each industry) were studied. This essentially qualitative research was unable to point 
to a single variable which might readily explain the incidence of contested unfair dismissal 
claims. These researchers concluded that in addition to the influences of the procedural 
approach, the style and methods adopted by managers, the respect they commanded among 
employees and their consistent application of normative standards shared with employees 





Boon (1992) conducted a study in New Zealand which included 597 cases covering both union 
and non-union sector employees for a five-year period (1987-1991). This study consisted of both 
arbitration and court decisions. Boon (1992) found that 51 per cent of employees were successful 
in their action against their employers. This research covered only issues relating to substantive 
reasons and procedural fairness but did not undertake a study of remedies awarded to successful 
complainant employees in contrast to Eden’s (1990) study which included this dimension. 
Chelliah (1998) examined 136 employment court decisions in New Zealand over a seven-year 
period including both union and non-union sector employees. Only 27 per cent of dismissals 
were found to be justified while 73 per cent were unjustified. Chelliah (1998) analysed 
procedural fairness and substantive aspects of all cases. However, this study did not research the 
remedies awarded to successful complainant employees.  
 
Eden (1990) studied 395 non-union cases in Canada covering a eleven-year period from 1979 to 
1989.  These cases were decided under Canadian federal jurisdiction. This study found that 
arbitrators upheld 34 per cent of employers’ dismissal decisions and 27 per cent of complainant 
employees were reinstated. The dependent variables in this study were “complaints sustained or 
denied” and remedies that flow from a complaint from an employee being upheld, that is, 
reinstatement and damages for suspension (the period between employee’s termination and 
reinstatement).  Eden’s (1990) research included as independent variables, the impact of 
employees’ characteristics/actions as well as employers’ characteristics and actions on the 





There is a dearth of similar research on unfair dismissals in Australia. In spite of reliable sources 
of primary dismissal case data being available, for example the free online data available from 
the Australian Legal Information Institute and the Australian Industrial Relations Commission 
web sites, rigorous research has not been undertaken. The current study seeks to fill this gap in 
the literature by focusing on the area of unfair dismissals under the current federal legislation 
(Workplace Relations Act, 1996). There is some anecdotal evidence that the present legislation is 
far less employee-friendly than its predecessor, the Industrial Relations Reform Act, 1993. It 
would be useful to determine what approach arbitrators take when considering the appropriate 
remedy for proven unfair dismissal. It is important to gain an understanding of the circumstances 
that lead to an award of reinstatement as opposed to monetary compensation. Where 
reinstatement is ordered, what length of suspension is compensated? This is another key 
question. Whenever monetary compensation is awarded, what factors influence the approach 
taken by the arbitrators? How is the quantum of monetary compensation reached? This research 
attempts to provide answers to these questions using statistical analysis of data to provide a 
better understanding of arbitrators’ decisions. 
 
VARIABLES INCLUDED IN THIS STUDY 
In order to gain a deeper understanding of the arbitration process, an extensive review of the 
literature was carried out (Boon, 1992; Chelliah, 1998; Eden, 1990; Goodman, Earnshaw, 
Marchington & Harrision, 1998). Based on this review as well as written decisions of arbitrators 






The conceptual model as displayed in Figure 1 indicates that an analysis of the arbitration 
process with respect to unfair dismissals and remedies require investigation covering three 
dependent variables which are based on the outcomes of arbitration. The first dependent variable, 
award, measures whether the complaint of unfair dismissal by the employee was upheld or 
denied by the arbitrator. The second dependent variable, damages, measures the weeks of 
remuneration awarded to those employees who are reinstated. The third dependent variable, 
compensation, measures the weeks of remuneration awarded to those employees whose 
complaints were upheld but were not reinstated. 
 
 




Independent Variables  
The independent variables are derived primarily from the literature on factors which are taken 
into consideration by arbitrators when arriving at a decision (Chelliah, 1998; Eden, 1990). In 
addition, variables were also included based on the principles of ‘just cause’ under common law 
(Davies & Freedland, 1984), ‘fair dismissal’ under section 170 CG(3) and ‘appropriate remedy’ 
under 170 CH(2) of the Workplace Relations Act, 1996. 
 
Independent variables likely to be associated with the first dependent variable, reward, can be 
categorised according to the type of offence, employee characteristics and employer 
characteristics. Replicating Eden’s (1990) study, twelve independent variables were identified 




the seriousness of a particular offence (Eden, 1990). The second category, employee 
characteristics, include past record, length of service, lack of intent in committing the offence, 
willingness to accept fault for the wrong-doing, isolated incident of misconduct, special 
compassionate or economic circumstances, rehabilitation potential, absence of pre-meditation 
and position in the organisation. The third category, employer characteristics, include the 
application of progressive discipline, failure to administer warnings, absence of a culminating 
incident, improper work rules, unequal treatment, provocation, condonation and lack of 
procedural fairness. 
 
Independent variables expected to be associated with second dependent variable, damages, 
include length of service, reinstatement requested by complainant, gender, employee’s 
profession, compassionate circumstances present, remorse, conflict between employer and 
complainant, complainant’s job abolished, difficulty in finding another job, employment 
relationship broken down, labour market conditions, period of suspension, mitigation of losses, 
complainant at fault and new job after dismissal. 
 
Independent variables which are likely to be associated with the third dependent variable, 
compensation, include years of service, gender, employee’s profession, new job after dismissal, 
difficulty in finding another job, time-lapse between discharge and award, labour market 






Data for empirical analysis was collected from unfair dismissal case decisions rendered by 
arbitrators of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission. These cases on unfair dismissals were 
obtained from the on-line AustLII Databases. This site on the internet is hosted by the Australian 
Legal Information Institute (AustLII) and provides a free database of cases determined by the 
Australian Industrial Relations Commission. 
 
Decisions dealing solely with the preliminary objections regarding the Australian Industrial 
Relations Commission’s jurisdiction to hear the case or extension of time applications was 
excluded from the study. Such jurisdictional issues include disputes as to whether complainants 
met the eligibility requirements of the statutory protection.  684 cases of arbitration decisions 
ranging in length from 25 to 75 pages each, comprised the total population for this study.  
 
With this aim, every second case listed in each industry grouping was selected for analysis. In other 
words, 50 per cent of all cases in each industry grouping were selected for analysis. The final sample 
included in this study consisted of 342 cases from 17 industries. Both logistic and ordinary least 
squares regression were used to analyse the data.  
 
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
Award by the Arbitrator 
The analysis begins with the first dependent variable, award, that is whether a complaint was 
upheld or denied and the predictor variables associated with the decisions of arbitrators to uphold 




50.6% of the complaints were upheld, that is the arbitrators ruled in favour of the employee. It 
appears that overall both employees and employers had an equal chance of winning their cases in 
the four years covered by this study. Out of the total of 173 employees who were successful in 
having their complaints upheld, 37 were reinstated whilst 136 were awarded compensation only. 
In other words, only 10.8% of complainants were reinstated.  
Additional analysis of the data indicated that the most frequent offences for employees were 
violation of rules, abandonment of work, unsatisfactory performance and incompatibility with 
other employees or supervisors.  Nearly two-thirds (66.1%) of the employees had no previous 
record of being disciplined. 
 
Logistic regression was used to identify significant independent variables in relation to the first 
dependent variable, award, (that is employee’s complaint being upheld or denied). Logistic 
regression was used since the dependent variable was binary or dichotomous (Morgan & Griego, 
1998). Award was coded 1 if the employee’s complaint was upheld and 0 if the complaint was 
denied. Table 1 confirms that there are only 5 significant predictors of awards. These predictors 
are dishonesty, years of service, failure to apply progressive discipline, failure to provide 
warnings and improper promulgation of rules. 
 
 




In table 1, the value of Exp(B) gives the “odds ratio”, which is the increase (or decrease if the 
ratio is less than one) in odds of being in one outcome category when the value of the predictor 




increase in odds of an outcome of 1 (the ‘response’ category) with a one-unit change in the 
predictor. In this model, for the dependent variable, award, interpretation of the results are as 
follows:  
• The predictor ‘Dishonesty’(Exp(B) of 9.30) indicates that where an employee was found 
to be dishonest, the odds of the complaint being declined rather than upheld are over 9 
times as much as where an employee was not dishonest; 
• The predictor ‘Years of Service’ (Exp(B) of 1.07) indicates that where an employee was 
found to have more years of service, the odds of the complaint being upheld rather than 
declined was 1.07 times as much as where an employee had less service; 
• The predictor ‘failure to apply progressive discipline’ indicates that where the employer 
fails to carry out progressive discipline, the odds of the employee’s complaint being 
upheld increases by 98.5% (1-.015); 
• The predictor ‘failure to provide warnings’ indicates that where an employer fails to warn 
an employee of unsatisfactory performance, the odds of the employee’s complaint being 
upheld increases by 97.1% (1-.029); and  
• The predictor ‘improper promulgation of rules’ indicates that where there is improper 
promulgation of workrules by the employer, the odds of the employee’s complaint being 




These are interesting statistics as they give an indication of the predictors that are highly likely to 
affect the decision-making of an arbitrator in relation to upholding or denying an employee’s 
complaint. Dishonesty by an employee is almost certain to swing a decision in favour of the 
employer. However, in cases where the employee had a long period of service or when the 
employer failed to apply progressive discipline, warn the employee about unsatisfactory 
performance and adequately promulgate work rules, the decision of the arbitrator was likely to 
be in favour of the employee. 
 
Damages for Employees Reinstated 
The second dependent variable is damages (measured in weeks of remuneration) awarded to 
those employees who were reinstated. In total 37 employees out of the 173 employees who were 
successful in having their complaints upheld, were reinstated. Damages awarded by arbitrators 
usually covered the period for which the employee was suspended from work (mean = 17.57 
weeks). However, reduced damages were awarded if the employer had already paid 
compensation to the employee prior to termination or the employee was culpable to a certain 
extent. 
 
Regression analysis for the second dependent variable, damages, indicates that only one 
independent variable was significant. Period of suspension had a significant, positive relationship 
with damages (ß = .77, p < .001) (see Table 2). The results indicated that as the time interval 
between dismissal and reinstatement increases, damages awarded are likely be higher. 
 
 







Compensation for Employees not reinstated but complaints upheld 
The third and final dependent variable is compensation (measured in weeks of remuneration)  
awarded to those employees whose complaints were upheld but were not reinstated. In total, 136 
out of the 173 employees who were successful in having their complaints upheld, were awarded 
compensation only. In other words, more than three-fourth (78.6%) of employees who had their 
complaint upheld, were not reinstated. 
 
Analysis of the data indicates that there is practically no correlation between the waiting time 
and compensation awarded. While the mean waiting time between termination and the decision 
of the arbitrator was 36.45 weeks, the mean compensation awarded was 13.21 weeks wages. In 
some cases the arbitrator awarded the maximum of 26 weeks as prescribed in the legislation, 
while in other cases damages seem to have been awarded based on the merits of the case.  
 
Regression analysis for compensation (measured in weeks of remuneration awarded) indicates 
that only two predictors are significant. ‘Years of Service’ had a significant, positive relationship 
with compensation (ß = .23, p < .01) while ‘Complainant is at fault’ had a significant, negative 
relationship with compensation (ß = -.39, p < .001) (see Table 3). These results indicate that 
arbitrators are likely to award more compensation to employees who have longer periods of 
service with the employer. However, when the complainant is at fault, arbitrators are likely to 
award less compensation. 
 
 









This study focused on arbitration awards with respect to unfair dismissal complaints in Australia. 
This research specifically examined the independent variables that are associated with arbitration 
awards, damages and compensation. The study found that dishonesty, years of service, failure to 
apply progressive discipline, failure to provide warnings and improper promulgation of rules are 
associated with arbitration awards. The results also indicate that the period of suspension is 
associated with damages awarded to employees who are reinstated. In addition the employee’s 
period of service and culpability are associated with the amount of compensation awarded. 
 
The results of this study have significant implications for employers and employees. Given that 
more than half (50.6%) of unfair dismissal complaints by employees were upheld by arbitrators, 
it could be said that from the employer’s perspective, unnecessary expenditure may have been 
incurred from the date of termination to the date of the decision of the arbitrator. This 
expenditure may have been incurred in the form of legal advice and representation, time of staff 
involved, etc. The results of this study also indicate that damages awarded increases with the 
period of suspension. In addition, the pending action may cause adversity towards the employer 
by existing staff and unions. The cost of this adversity while not easily quantifiable in dollar 
terms, is likely to have a negative impact on morale, productivity and the quality of employee 
relations in the workplace. 
 
No doubt, factors other than merit, may influence the parties to proceed to arbitration. However, 




decision. Accordingly, it could be argued that in light of the fact that 50.6% of complaints were 
upheld, a change in employer industrial relations practices is necessary, especially if employers 
desire a more harmonious workplace. 
 
Given that the research shows some measure of predictability in terms of the factors considered 
by arbitrators in making their decisions, there may be strategic implications for the way 
employers respond to employee misconduct in the workplace. To some extent, arbitrator 
decisions may force employers into reshaping processes that relate to performance management, 
discipline and termination. Specifically, employer response to an employee’s wrongdoing should 
include consideration of the nature of the offence, the employee’s record and the length of 
service, before resorting to dismissal. The employer must observe the statutory requirements of 
section 170 CG(3) and this is best met by administering a fair and robust system of progressive 
discipline. One area requiring improvement is the necessity to sufficiently document warnings, 
provide counselling and necessary training for employees, so that they can attain the standards 
expected by the employer. Employers must make the necessary policy changes to ensure that 
supervisors/managers are trained in the administration of progressive discipline. Compliance 
with policy needs to be constantly monitored by employers as well.  
 
An important point to recall is that the number of dismissed employees who actually pursued 
unjust dismissal complaints under this legislation is unknown. If it is a small proportion, 
employers may well weigh the risk of arbitration against any major change in practices. Another 
factor to be considered in weighing the risk of arbitral intervention in the decision to dismiss, is 




difficult to advise employers on the overall picture of unfair dismissals. It is suggested that 
employers seek alternative mechanisms to arbitration to alleviate the considerable time delays in 
arbitration decisions. Such alternative mechanisms could be to establish an internal employee-
employer committee consisting of people with more in-depth knowledge of the workplace than 
third party arbitrators who have little knowledge of the dynamics of a particular workplace.  
 
Statutory protection under the Workplace Relations Act, 1996 also has important implications 
for employees covered under this legislation. For employees, offences such as dishonesty reflect 
badly in the eyes of arbitrators. Long serving employees can expect their length of service to be 
taken into consideration in the calculation of compensation. Where employers fail to apply 
progressive discipline or where there is improper promulgation of work rules by the employers, 
employees can expect a favourable decision from the arbitrator. This study clearly shows that the 
Workplace Relations Act, 1996 unlike its predecessor (Industrial Relations Reform Act, 1993), 
has lead arbitrators to treat procedural fairness as a technical irregularity, thereby reducing 
protection to employees. The empirical analysis shows that lack of procedural fairness is clearly 
not a significant factor in influencing the decision of the arbitrator. This confirms earlier 
suspicions by legal experts such as Chief Justice Murray Wilcox that the Workplace Relations 
Act will denigrate the traditional importance of procedural fairness in the process of fair 
dismissal of employees (Wilcox, 1997). Employees cannot rely on lack of procedural fairness by 
employers to be a factor that would influence arbitrators’ decisions in their favour. Employees 
may wish to lobby their politicians and unions to restore the importance of procedural fairness in 
future legislation or even incorporate it into employment contracts such as enterprise agreements 





From an employee’s perspective, the findings of this study indicate that arbitration does not 
really bring significant benefits. While 50.6% of arbitration decisions were in favour of 
employees, only 10.8% of the total complainants were reinstated and received damages. The 
mean amount of damages awarded was only equal to 17.57 weeks wages. Although, the 
Workplace Relations Act, 1996 retains reinstatement as the primary remedy, it is sad to note that 
there is very little chance of employees actually reclaiming their jobs. The fact that 78.6% of 
successful complainants were granted only a relatively low amount of compensation (mean of 
13.21 weeks wages) seems to indicate that arbitrators continue to resort to the common law 
remedy of damages or compensation rather than reinstatement. Even though the maximum 
amount of damages or compensation prescribed under the Workplace Relations Act, 1996 is the 
equivalent of 26 weeks wages, arbitrators have on average awarded only half this amount, even 
when the employee was not going to be reinstated. 
 
Finally, the tendency to award monetary compensation far more frequently than reinstatement 
could be viewed as a deficiency in the arbitral regime from the employee’s perspective. The 
unavailability of reinstatement as a remedy was seen as a major deficiency of the common law 
regime. Statutory protection was intended to bridge this gap by providing reinstatement as a 
primary remedy. However, if arbitrators overwhelmingly rule against reinstatement, one wonders 
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(Mean = 17.57 weeks wages) 
Compensation 






Results of Logistic Regression Analysis for Award 
 
 
 Variables     B  Wald  Exp(B) 
 
 
Excessive absenteeism    -1.06   .55   .35 
Absent without permission       .59   .33  1.80 
Negligence         .86   .61  2.35 
Alleged abandonment of employment     .99  1.34  2.70 
Excluded by Workplace Relations Act   1.97  2.90  7.19 
Insubordination       -.63   .57    .53 
Dishonesty       2.23*  3.73  9.30 
Unsatisfactory work performance      .64   .80  1.90 
Alcohol related offence      -.55   .24    .57 
Negative attitude        .37   .23  1.45 
Violation of rules        .00   .00  1.00 
Other offences      16.55   .00     15438840 
Previous disciplinary record       .21   .46  1.23 
Years of service        .07*  4.92  1.07 
Gender         .34   .54  1.41 
Pattern of misconduct      1.47  2.41  4.33 
Pre-meditated misconduct     1.13  1.98  3.09 
Remorse       1.24  1.03  3.45 
Failure to apply progressive discipline  -4.22** 8.11    .02 
Failure to warn     -3.53** 9.31    .03 
Procedural error              -35.04   .00    .99 
Improper promulgation of rules   -3.63*** 6.27    .03 
Unequal Treatment               -21.36   .00    .00 
Provocation                 -21.34   .00    .99 
Employer condoned similar behaviour            -14.12   .00    .99 
Constant       76.80 
 
R2             .62 
F                    17.70*** 
 
 
*     p < .05 
**   p < .01 






Results of Regression Analysis for Damages 
 
 
 Variables       Beta 
 
 
Years of service       -.22 
Reinstatement requested by complainant    -.17 
Gender         .25 
Employee’s profession       .08 
Compassionate circumstances present     .12 
Remorse         -.31 
Conflict between employer and complainant     .04 
Complainant’s job abolished      -.23 
Difficulty in finding another job     -.09 
Employment relationship broken down    -.10 
Labour market condition       .22 
Period of suspension        .77*** 
Mitigation of losses        .17 
Complainant at fault        .24 
New job after dismissal      -.39 
 
R2          .59 
F                   2.05* 
 
 
*     p < .05 
**   p < .01 






Results of Regression Analysis for Compensation 
 
 
 Variables       Beta 
 
 
Years of service        .23** 
Gender        -.02 
Employee’s profession      -.02 
New job after dismissal      -.05 
Difficulty in finding another job      .03 
Time lapse between discharge and award     .07 
Labour market condition       .16 
Mitigation of losses        .13 
Complainant at fault       -.39*** 
 
R2           .23 
F         4.12*** 
 
 
*     p < .05 
**   p < .01 
*** p < .001 
 
